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In this paper we propose a non-equilibrium model in order to ex-
plain the search behavior of unemployed workers. This modeling strat-
egy, framed in a rational choice paradigm, allows us to investigate the
eﬀects of negative duration dependence in the out-of-unemployment haz-
ard rate, accounting for a decrease in employability as the unemployment
spell lengthens. We show that individuals react to an expected reduction
in their search eﬀectiveness by increasing their search eﬀorts. We then
analyze active and passive labor market policies, consisting in training
programs and income support schemes. We show that it is optimal for the
government to include among the eligibility criteria for subsidized training
a minimum length of the unemployment spell. However, it is optimal to
recruit workers before they become discouraged and stop searching. We
also show that for a broad range of the parameters the optimal income
support scheme takes the form of unemployment beneﬁts granted for a
limited amount of time starting from the beginning of the unemployment
spell, coupled with social assistance for long-term unemployed with very
limited residual employability.
1 Introduction
It is well known that income support schemes to ﬁght poverty might actually
dynamically exacerbate the problem, as they also have an eﬀect on the labor
supply decision of individuals and on their ability to ﬁnd a job.
In their inﬂuential work on welfare dependence, Bane and Ellwood (1994)
provide a theoretical framework for the behavioral models underlying the poten-
tial detrimental role of welfare. They discuss three models: the rational choice
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1model, the expectancy model and the cultural model. The rational choice par-
adigm motivates most of the empirical studies on work disincentives, i.e. the
negative eﬀects of welfare transfers on labor supply. Individuals subject to
the constraints given by actual work opportunities and welfare policies, choose
whether and how much to work following the principle of maximization of util-
ity: if the beneﬁt is rather convenient with respect to work, individuals prefer
welfare and stay out of the labor market. Long-term welfare participation fol-
lows as a result of a series of conscious and rational choices. The latter models
relate instead to individuals’ self-esteem and to the interaction of agents behav-
ior (living in environments where most of the people rely on welfare instead of
work may favor the change of attitudes and mores, and the development of a
diﬀerent system of values).
Aside of the potentially detrimental eﬀect of the amount of beneﬁts, Bane
and Ellwood (among others) recognize that the duration of economic subsidies
paid out by public assistance is also crucial. It is generally thought that systems
providing long term beneﬁts are costly and not eﬃcient. Moreover, according to
the “welfare trap” theory, long duration of interventions may itself constitute a
cause of poverty, as recipients may develop dependence on the subsidy, making
it more diﬃcult to become autonomous from public support.
Most of the empirical studies (Dazinger, Haveman and Plotnick, 1981; Er-
mish and Wright, 1990; Hoynes, 1996; see also Moﬃt, 1992, Moﬃt, 2002 and
Blank, 2002 for extensive surveys) – largely referred to the U.S. program AFDC
1 – exploit time and cross-state variation in the beneﬁt level 2 for identiﬁcation
of the impact of the programs. This body of work conﬁrms that transfer pro-
grams considerably reduce work eﬀort. More recently, research has dealt with
the impact of reforms of social assistance on labor supply: work requirements,
sanctions, time limits, education or training programs programs (for example:
Moﬃt, 2003; Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours; 2004).
Another strand of the literature concentrates on the eﬀect of the level of
beneﬁts (or other speciﬁc features of the program) on welfare participation and
on entry/exit rates from welfare. As regards exit rates, the aim is to assess
the indirect eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on welfare spell length - if people reduce
work eﬀort because of the subsidy, time on welfare should increase (Blank, 1989;
Hoynes e MaCurdy, 1994, Fortin, Lacroix and Drolet, 2004). Overall, there is
a robust empirical evidence that a rise in the amount of the subsidy increases
welfare participation and entry rates, while exit rates drop. Other studies focus
on the assessment of negative duration dependence (some examples are Blank,
1989; Dahl, Lorentzen, 2003; Chay et al, 2005).
Active labor market policies have been developed to avoid the detrimental
eﬀects of simple income support schemes. The idea is to “bring people back
1Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the main income support for the poor in the
USA, which was speciﬁcally designed to support lone mothers with children. The program
was replaced in 1996 by the more restrictive program Temporary Aid for Needy Families.
2the diﬀerences among states in the potential maximum beneﬁt level under the AFDC
program were very marked; moreover this level underwent signiﬁcant changes in the 1960s to
’80s period (Moﬃt, 1992)
2to work” – whenever possible – as the best, and most cost-eﬀective, way to
ﬁght poverty (Heckman et al., 1999). Training programs diﬀer along a number
of dimensions. They may consist in remedial basic education – for instance
in reading and math – in vocational training or in short-term subsidized work
experiences at government or non-proﬁt agencies. Other programs (which fall
outside the interest of this paper) may be directed toward employed individuals
as on-the-job training, or involve job search assistance, including resume and
interview preparation and help in focusing search strategy (see Barnow, 1989,
for a comprehensive list). Empirical investigations have focused both on income
gains (Friedlander et al., 1997) and on increases in employability (Orr et al.,
1996). With respect to income eﬀects the evidence suggests modest but posi-
tive eﬀects but also modest costs, hence a signiﬁcant social rate of return. This
is true especially for particular groups of people (like adult women), while the
impact for other groups (like adult men or youth) seems to be highly uncertain.
In terms of increasing job ﬁnding rates for long-term unemployed, there is am-
ple evidence that active labor market programs have small and in some cases
even adverse eﬀects. Some programs do provide positive incentives, although
quite unintended. When mandatory, the threat of program participation can be
so harsh that some individuals increase their search activity and/or lower their
reservation wages in order to ﬁnd a job before the program starts. When vol-
untary, the issue of the determinants of program participation arises (Heckman
and Smith, 2004).
The rational choice approach to the analysis of the interactions between
unemployment, welfare and poverty rests on the equilibrium analysis of the
labor market provided by search models (see Rogerson et al, 2005 for a sur-
vey). In particular, Pissarides (2000, ch. 5) provides the standard equilibrium
search model with varying search intensity. In that model, a worker continually
chooses his search intensity s with increasing and strictly convex disutility c(s).
Job oﬀers arrive according to a continuous time Poisson process with arrival rate
sη(θ), where θ measures labor market tightness and η is an increasing function.
Search intensity can thus be thought of simply as “technical change” in the job
matching technology summarized by the matching function. Workers choose
their search eﬀort in order to maximize their utility; ﬁrms choose how many
vacancies to open in order to maximize their proﬁts; the free entry, zero proﬁt
condition is imposed. The result is that an increase of the utility in unemploy-
ment (for instance due to unemployment beneﬁts), a decrease of the expected
utility in employment (such as a decrease in the expected wage) and an increase
in the cost of search unambiguously lower search intensity, thus increasing the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the unemployment duration.
We start from a model similar in spirit, but we develop it along completely
diﬀerent lines. First of all, we are not interested in general equilibrium analysis.
We focus on a restricted group of workers, namely those more at risk of poverty.
Hence, we can assume their work supply decision has a negligible impact on any
individual probability of ﬁnding a job. Moreover, the decision on the part of the
ﬁrms on how many vacancies to open is largely independent, and we consider
it as exogenous. We are thus left with a much simpler, partial equilibrium
3model, that we can then complicate by considering that search eﬀectiveness
might changes in a foreseable way over time. For instance, individuals might
expect a macroeconomic downturn, or they might anticipate that their ability
to ﬁnd a job will deteriorate as the unemployment spell becomes longer. The
latter might be due to a loss of skills, to a change in the structure and dimension
of the network of people the unemployed person can contact, to stigma eﬀects,
etc. Note that standard equilibrium search models ` a la Pissarides can only
account for unexpected changes in the environment. As individuals realize that
the economy has entered a downturn, they immediately react by lowering their
search eﬀort. This is quite unsatisfactory since it yields
the counterfactual prediction that labor market participation and
other measures of search intensity should be strongly procyclical
and unemployment should be acyclical or even procyclical (Shimer,
2003).
Indeed, Shimer – along the lines of Stigler (1961) – has developed a discrete time
equilibrium search model where search intensity is modeled as a worker’s choice
of the number of simultaneous applications to make. He gets the main result
that when the cost of making an application is small, workers with high em-
ployability react to an adverse shock by increasing their search intensity, while
workers with low employability become discouraged, reducing their search in-
tensity. In this model however downturns aﬀect the productivity of ﬁlled jobs
and the (exogenous) separation rate, and not the search eﬀectiveness (which is
endogenously determined). Here on the contrary we treat the search eﬀective-
ness as exogenous: a decrease in this parameter can thus be attributed both to
a decrease in the employability of the individual or to a worsening of the general
conditions of the economy. We will show that unemployed workers react to an
expected decrease in their search eﬀectiveness by increasing their search eﬀort
to exploit the most out of good times.
From a modeling perspective, letting search eﬀectiveness vary over time in
a systematic way impedes from imposing stationarity conditions, and forces us
to a non-equilibrium analysis.
We then turn to investigating two policies aimed at contrasting poverty. One
is an (active) program of training, that allows individuals to upgrade their skills
and hence improve their subsequent employability. The other is a (passive)
income support scheme, that can take the form of either unemployment or
poverty beneﬁts. Unemployment beneﬁts are deemed to end after a few periods
in unemployment; poverty beneﬁts might become permanent.
As for the ﬁrst measure, we characterize the individual and social optimal
timing for undertaking a training program: we show that they do not generally
coincide and hence that it might be optimal for an unemployed worker to turn
down an oﬀer to undertake a training course, even if it is for free (provided that
the unemployed expects the oﬀer to be repeated in the future). This might help
explaining the low attendancy rate of public training courses, as experienced in
many European countries.
4As for what concerns beneﬁts, we show that it is optimal for the government
to oﬀer short-lived unemployment beneﬁts, then leave the unemployed worker
on his/her own for a while, and ﬁnally let the public assistance to take place
when employability falls below a minimum threshold.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model with varying search eﬀectiveness, and shows that when an unemployed
worker expects his/her search eﬀectiveness γ is going to decrease at time t + 1,
the likelihood of an active search increases. Section 3 adds structure by consid-
ering a linear decay in search eﬀectiveness. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis
of training courses that allow the unemployed to re-gain employability, while
section 5 oﬀers a uniﬁed approach to the analysis of passive welfare policies like
unemployment beneﬁts and minimum income schemes. Section 6 summarizes
and concludes.
2 The model
The value VU of being unemployed at time t is given by:
VU,t = Ut(st) + R[(1 − pt(st))VU,t+1 + pt(st)VE,t+1] (1)
where Ut is the utility in unemployment and depends on the search eﬀort st,
pt = γtst,γ ∈ [0,1] is the probability of getting a job in the period as a function
of both search eﬀectiveness γt and search intensity st and VE,t+1 is the value
of being employed once found a job. R is the intertemporal discount factor.
Analogously, the value VE of being employed at time t is given by:
VE,t = Et + R[(1 − δ)VE,t+1 + δVU,t+1] (2)
where Et is the utility in employment (as a function of the wage w and
other characteristics of the job) and δ is the exogenous separation probability.
We assume that there is no on-the-job search.
Such a model would be generally solved in equilibrium, by imposing the
stationarity conditions VU,t = VU and VE,t = VE. Then, the value of VU would
be maximized with respect to s (possibly imposing an internal solution), thus
identifying the optimal search strategy given search eﬀectiveness γ.
Since search eﬀectiveness generally depends on (i) how many vacancies are
open, and (ii) how many unemployed workers compete for these vacancies, in a
general equilibrium search models we would also look at what happens on the
ﬁrms’ side. By imposing some equilibrium condition such as zero proﬁts, the
optimal number of vacancies would be derived. Search eﬀectiveness would then
follow, allowing the model to close.
Here on the contrary we assume that γt is not constant over time. We do not
assume any particular evolution for γt: however, we suppose that a (suﬃciently
long) employment spell acts as a reset event, bringing γ to some original value.
If we measure time as time in unemployment (i.e. beginning at the start of
the unemployment spell), this value is labeled γ0. Note that VE,t in eq. 2
5depends on the value of future unemployment spells, but crucially not on the
current search intensity st. If employment acts as a reset event, we can then
simply write VE = E + R[(1 − δ)VE + δV0], independent of time. Substituting
recursively in eq. 1 and stopping, for clarity, at time t = 3, we obtain:
VU,t = Ut + Ut+1R(1 − pt) + Ut+2R
2(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)
+ Ut+3R
3(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)(1 − pt+2)
+ VERpt + VER
2(1 − pt)pt+1 + VER
3(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)pt+2
+ VER
4(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)(1 − pt+2)pt+3
+ R
4(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)(1 − pt+2)(1 − pt+3)VU,t+4
= Ut + Ut+1R(1 − pt) + Ut+2R
2(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)
+ Ut+3R
3(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)(1 − pt+2)
+ VERpt + VER
2(1 − pt)pt+1 + VER
3(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)pt+2
+ VER
4(1 − pt)(1 − pt+1)(1 − pt+2)pt+3
+ ǫ
(3)
with ǫ going to 0 as we proceed with expliciting VU,t. This expression might
be generalized in:












(1 − pt+j−1) (4)
with pt−1 = 0. This general expression won’t be used any longer, as focusing
instead on eq. 3 is more intuitive. As pt increases due to an increase in the
search intensity st the only term that increases is VERpt, while everything else
diminishes3. If we assume that U is linear in s the optimal level of st is thus a
corner solution, either 0 or 1. The switch between these two cases takes place






where U(0) = U(s = 0) and U(1) = U(s = 1).
The unemployed worker undertakes active search when γt is above the thresh-
old and rests idle when it is below.
2.1 Deterioration in search eﬀectiveness
We will now show that when an unemployed worker expects his/her search
eﬀectiveness γ is going to decrease (increase) at time t + 1, the likelihood of
an active search increases (decreases). Note ﬁrst than if γt+1 is expected to
go down then VU,t+1 must either remain constant or go down as well. To see
this, consider the case when the optimal search intensity – before the decrease
in γt+1 is considered – was st = 0. After taking into account the decrease in
3the derivative of Ut with respect to search intensity s being obviously negative
6γt+1 the optimal solution, and hence VU,t+1 must remain the same. Consider
now the case when the optimal search intensity – before the decrease in γt+1 is
considered – was st+1 = 1. After taking into account the decrease in γt+1 the
value of VU,t+1 has to go down, both if the new optimal solution is still st+1 = 1
(since the probability of ﬁnding a job goes down anyway) and if it becomes
st+1 = 0 (this choice was already available before). But if VU,t+1 goes down
the threshold γ∗
t goes up. Hence, the likelihood of an active search when the
search eﬀectiveness is still high increases. A symmetric argument holds when
the unemployed worker expects his/her search eﬀectiveness to increase.
3 Negative duration dependence in
out-of-unemployment hazard rate
We now explicit a law of decay for search eﬀectiveness as the unemployment
spell increases. This amounts to introduce negative duration dependence in the
hazard rate. As already stated, negative duration dependence might arise as a
consequence of a loss of skills (at least with respect to those still at work), to
a change in the structure and dimension of the network of people to whom the
individual is connected, to stigma eﬀects, to a general loss of capacity due to the
prolonged reduction in income ﬂows, etc. If unemployed workers are not able to
anticipate this loss of employability we are back to the equilibrium framework
where the expected value of being unemployed at time t+1 is the current value:
E[VU,t+1] = VU,t. As a consequence, the threshold in eq. 5 does not change.
In such a setting, this threshold would then be compared not with the actual
search eﬀectiveness at time t+1, but with its perceived value. However, it would
be curious to assume that individuals have (persistently) imperfect perception
but perfect rationality. The whole model would look inappropriate and a more
behavioristic speciﬁcation should be preferred.
Here we consider the case where individuals have rational expectations about
their search eﬀectiveness, and correctly estimate that it decays at a constant rate
θ < 1: γt+1 = γt(1 − θ). After some time T the search eﬀectiveness will be so
low that the unemployed individual will be better oﬀ stop searching: γt goes to
0, while γ∗
t converges to a positive value 4, since Ut>T = U(0) and pt>T = 0.
Consequently, VU,t>T = U(0)/(1 − R).














(1 − R)VE − U(0)
(7)




(1 − R)VE − U(0)
7Intuitively, the amount of time the individual undertakes active search in-
creases in the initial skills γ0 and in the value attached to employment VE, while
decreases as the disutility from search U(1) and the depreciation rate θ increase.
Finally, note that if VE < U(0)/(1 − R) the individual does not search at all.
4 Training courses
In this section, we deal with active labor market policies aimed at improving
employability, such as training courses. Of course anyone can decide to under-
take a training course, and bear the whole cost of it. But it could be in the
social interest to encourage unemployed workers to attend retraining, if unem-
ployment (which might lead to poverty) is considered a social problem and the
private incentives are considered too low. So, we ﬁrst turn to the problem of
optimally choosing whether and when to undertake retraining from an individ-
ual point of view. We then explicit a social welfare function and investigate the
problem from the point of view of a benevolent government. We will show that
the solutions of the two problems generally diﬀer, and discuss the implications.
In particular, we will argue that training courses ﬁnanced at least partly with
public money should include among the eligibility criteria a minimum length
of the unemployment spell. On the other hand we will also show that it could
be optimal for an unemployed worker to turn down the free invitation to follow
a training course, given the expectation that it will be possible (even at less
advantageous conditions) to attend it in the future.
4.1 The problem of the individual
Suppose that following a training course that lasts for 1 period allows to recover
the initial search eﬀectiveness γ0. The extension to the case when requaliﬁcation
is only partial or it takes longer is straightforward. By the way, note that
the problem of choosing the optimal timing for retraining is identical to the
problem of choosing the optimal timing of an investment in the replacement
of a machinery. Let UF be the utility deriving from following the course (this
possibly includes the payment of a fee, the receipt of a scholarship, etc.). The
optimal period T to undertake the course is characterized by the condition
VU,t = VU,T+1 (it is not convenient to wait any longer):
a) Program in t = T:
VU,T = +UF + RV0 ≡ F (8)
(b) Program in t = T + 1:
VU,T = UT + R[(1 − pT)F + pTVE] (9)
Hence:
pT =
(1 − R)F − UT
R(VE − F)
(10)
8Now, there are 2 possibilities: (i) T happens when s = 1 and the individual
is still searching; (ii) T happens at a time when s = 0 and the individual has





If F > F∗ it is convenient to take the course in T; otherwise it will never
be convenient. By a continuity argument, if it is convenient to take the course
in the ﬁrst period when s = 0 then it would still be convenient to enter the
program in the period before, when the individual is still searching even if with
a low probability of ﬁnding a job. Thus, it is possible to focus on case (i). The
best moment for taking a training course is then identiﬁed by:
(1 − θ)T =
(1 − R)F − U(1)
γ0R(VE − F)
(12)
The optimal delay from the start of the unemployment spell increases in
U(1). As for what concerns the eﬀect of F, note ﬁrst that if the private cost of
the training course (which lowers F and may reasonably bring it to a negative
value) is too high, then (1−R)F < U(1). Assuming VE > F (which is obviously
true if F is negative), the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive
and the individual will never choose to undertake retraining. The derivative of




(1 − R)F − U(1)




which is positive (T decreases) if the no-training condition does not hold –
(1−R)F > U(1) – while the “innocuous” condition VE > F is still true. Thus,
the optimal delay increases in the (private) cost of the program (which lowers
UF in eq. 8). The eﬀects of VE (hence of the wage w) and γ0 on the other hand
are ambiguous, since these two variables appear both at the denominator and
at the numerator (as part of V0, which is part of F).
In conclusion, it is generally not convenient to undertake a training course
immediately at the start of the unemployment spell, since the individual is
still “ﬁt enough” for the labor market. However, one could think that the
ﬁring probability is not entirely exogenous, and that those who loose a job have
inadequate skills. If the training course allows to reach a level of employability
γF higher than the one the unemployed worker has when ﬁred, γ0, the value
of being unemployed after having completed the course is VF > V0; hence the
optimal delay decreases, and vanishes when γ0 <
(1 − R)F − U(1)
R(VE − F)
.
Note that according to our result of section 2.1 knowing that the search
eﬀectiveness is going to increase as a result of a training course implies that the
likelihood of an active search before the course goes down. This however does
not aﬀect the argument above.
94.2 The problem of the society
Unemployment is generally regarded – at least in part – as a social problem.
This might be due to a negative value attached to unemployment itself, or to
the fact that unemployment lead to poverty and poverty is perceived as the
ultimate social problem. In both cases there might be a general interest to lift
people out of unemployment, or to increase the likelihood that they might get
a job. Active labor market policies explicitly have this aim. So, if the cost of
a training course is too high for the individual to bear it, it might be in the
general interest to pay it (totally or partly).
In order to proceed with a formal analysis, suppose that the government
attributes a cost D for each period of unemployment, irrespective of the length
of the spell. The government can contribute at a cost of C to a training course
that will increase his/her employability. Let E[u,t] be the expected residual
length of the unemployment spell after t periods in unemployment. The average
length of the unemployment spell is then E[u,0] ≡ ¯ u0. 5 We assume that the
government takes into consideration only the present spell, disregarding the
possibility of future spells. Should this happen, it will pose a new problem
to the government. Finally, we assume that the government discounts future
events at their probability of occurrence.
Anticipating the timing of the training course has three eﬀects: (i) it in-
creases the likelihood that it will actually be provided (since if the unemployed
worker ﬁnds a job the course is no longer necessary); (ii) it increases the prob-
ability the individual will ﬁnd a job, conditional on being still unemployed at
the time the course is ﬁnished; (iii) it decreases the relative advantage of taking
the course, since the initial skills of the worker are higher. To ﬁnd the optimal
trade-oﬀ between these eﬀects let’s look again at the time when there is no more
advantage in waiting (the negative contribution wi,t of individual i to the social
welfare function is minimal):
(a) Program in t = T:
wi,T = −C − du0 (14)
where C is the public cost of the course and u0 the subsequent expected
length of the unemployment spell.
(b) Program in t = T + 1:
wi,T+1 = −(1 − pT)d − (1 − pT)C − (1 − pT)du0 (15)
where the individual has a probability pT of ﬁnding a job in T, and takes the
course only if still unemployed at time T + 1, coming back to the labor market
at time T + 2.
Clearly, if the individual is not searching (pT = 0) it is convenient to antici-
pate the program: (a) > (b). Assuming T corresponds to a period in which the
individual is still searching, we have:
5When θ = 0, i.e. with no deterioration in the employability, the average unemployment
spell is u0 = 1
γ0 . In the general case θ  = 0 the average unemployment spell is obviously
higher, but it is still possible to show that it is ﬁnite (see the Appendix).
10(1 − θ)T =
d
γ0[C + d(u + 1)]
(16)
Hence the optimal delay increases in the (public) cost of the program and in
the average unemployment spell after having completed the program, while it
decreases in the social cost that is attributed to unemployment (the derivative
of the RHS with respect to d is positive). The eﬀect of γ0 is ambiguous because
when it increases it lowers the average length of an unemployment spell. How-
ever, if we suppose again that the training course leads to an employability γF
independent of γ0, then an increase in the skills the worker has when ﬁred lead
to postponing the course.
Ideally the government would ﬁne-tune the share of the total cost of the
training course paid by public money in order to let the solution to the individual
problem outlined in the previous section coincide with the social optimum (given
the burden on the public budget). This would also guarantee that training
takes place at a moment when the individual is still actively searching, as we
assumed. However, the solution of the individual problem depends on knowledge
of the individual utility function. If it is already quite strong to assume that
individuals are able to formalize a utility function for themselves, it is deﬁnitely
too heroic to assume that it will ever be possible for the government to know
these functions to any suﬃcient degree of accuracy. Moreover, since individuals
diﬀer with respect to the degree they value employment, unemployment, leisure,
consumption etc., even if the government had this knowledge oﬀering diﬀerent
oﬀers to otherwise equal individuals would look arbitrary and be politically
unfeasible.
So, the second best solution for the government would be to choose some
average C, for instance by estimating the response of unemployed workers to
the private cost of training. Then, depending on whether the government thinks
that mandatory retraining aﬀects the outcome of the training course 6, either
oﬀer the opportunity – after a minimum of T periods of unemployment – of
taking a subsidized training course or make it compulsory. Note that on average
– given the subsidy C computed as outlined above – individuals will freely choose
to undertake retraining exactly after T periods.
In conclusions we have stressed that – if employability decreases with the
length of the unemployment spell – it is optimal to include a minimum length
among the eligibility criteria for subsidized retraining, although it is optimal
to oﬀer retraining before unemployed workers become discouraged and stop
searching for a job. This is not due to a morale eﬀect, but to simple economic
considerations. We have also shown that some unemployed workers might decide
to postpone retraining even when it comes at no cost for them.
6forced attendance might reduce active involvement, although this is debated at an empir-
ical level (see references above)
115 Unemployment beneﬁts
In this section we propose a uniﬁed treatment, within the decreasing employa-
bility framework of our model, of unemployment beneﬁts and social assistance.
We will show that it is generally optimal for the government to initially oﬀer
unemployment beneﬁts, suspend them after some time in unemployment, and
then oﬀer unlimited income support schemes for those individuals that have
stopped searching for a job. Intuitively this happens because at the beginning
of the unemployment spell, when employability is still high, unemployed workers
would search anyway, both with and without the beneﬁt. The problems with
unemployment beneﬁts come when search eﬀectiveness has already decreased,
and thus the choice whether to search or not becomes more sensitive. As the du-
ration of the unemployment spell further increases, it comes to a point when the
individual would choose not to search even without the subsidy, thus removing
the disincentives of income support schemes.
Let’s begin with the trivial observation that unemployed workers would pre-
fer to be granted the maximum amount of beneﬁts, starting from the moment
when they are ﬁred, and possibly for the entire length of the unemployed spell.
Because of the beneﬁt the search intensity (or – in the linear case analyzed
above – the likelihood of an active search) would go down. With decreasing
employability the risk of being trapped in unemployment would then go up.
However, since the unemployed could still undertake the same search eﬀort that
was optimal without the beneﬁt, they would be inevitably better oﬀ.
On the other hand, if the goal is to ﬁght unemployment the optimal choice
from a social point of view would be to give no beneﬁts at all. 7
So, we assume that the government aims at reducing poverty, rather than
unemployment. We also assume that (for the weakest class of workers) income
in unemployment falls below the poverty line. The beneﬁt covers exactly the
gap 8. The problem is that granting a beneﬁt today on the one hand reduces the
poverty rate today, while on the other hand increases the poverty rate tomorrow,
since it possibly lowers job search.
Let’s consider the decision of granting a beneﬁt B at time t. As we have seen,
without the subsidy poverty and unemployment coincide: the expected duration
of a poverty spell is then equal to the expected duration of an unemployment
spell, ut. Thus we have:
(a) Without beneﬁt in t:
wi,T = −dut (17)
(b) With beneﬁt in t:
wi,T = −B − (1 − ˜ pt)ut+1 (18)
where ˜ pt = γt ˜ st is the probability of ﬁnding a job given the optimal level of
search intensity with the beneﬁt, ˜ s. We must then distinguish three cases: (i)
7We do not consider the case when the subsidy allows for a better search, hence leading
to a better quality of the match, which ﬁnally results in a lower separation probability and
consequently a lower unemployment rate.
8rather than an assumption this is a consequence of the speciﬁc goal of the government
12st = ˜ st = 1, active search both with and without the beneﬁt; (ii) st = 1; ˜ st = 0,
active search only without the beneﬁt; (iii) st = ˜ st = 0, no search both with
and without the beneﬁt.
Let’s start with the latter. Sub (iii) the expected duration of the poverty
spell, given the individual is poor (i.e. unemployed) in t is lt, where l is the
residual (working) life. It is then optimal to grant the subsidy whenever −dlt <
−B − d(lt − 1), or:
B < d (19)
that is the cost of the subsidy is smaller than the value attached to lift the
individual out of poverty.
Sub (ii) the condition becomes −dut < −B − dut+1, or:
B < d(ut − ut+1) (20)
which covers both the cases when t+1 is covered by the unemployed insur-
ance and when it is not.9 Now, with active search in t (and irrespective of what
happens in t + 1) ut and ut+1 are linked by the relation
ut = γt + (1 − γt)(ut+1 + 1) = 1 + (1 − γt)ut+1 (21)
Being unemployed at time t leads with a probability of γt to a duration of 1
and with a probability of 1−γt to a duration of ut+1+1. Note that the expected




. The condition ﬁnally becomes:
B < d(1 − γtut+1) = d∆ (22)
which is more restrictive than in case (iii) since ∆ < 1.
Finally, Sub (iii) granting the subsidy is optimal given −dut < −B − (1 −
γt)dut+1 and substituting eq. 21 we obtain again condition 19: B < d.
Now, assuming B < d the problem is that the government cannot discrimi-
nate between these three cases. Moreover, there is a strong incentive for unem-
ployed workers in case (ii) to stop searching and claim to be in case (iii), or to
claim they will not stop searching with the beneﬁt to be included in case (i).
To proceed further in the analysis we must then specify a particular functional
form for the individual utility function.
Let’s assume a Cobb-Douglas form U = CL (which meet the constraint
of linearity in s), with L = 1 − s. This implies U(1) = 0 and U(0) = C.
Consumption is at a minimal level C = ¯ C without the beneﬁt, while it raises
to C = ¯ C + B with the beneﬁt. In order to compute the moment when the
individual stops searching we keep on our initial assumption that the individual
has inﬁnite life and equal the value of VU,T in eq. 3 when sT = 0 and sT = 1, as
in eq. 27. We consider that at time T the individual has n remaining periods of
9If t + 1 is covered by the unemployed insurance, or if it is not but the individual stops
searching anyway (st+1 = 0), we simply have ut+1 = lt − 1.
13unemployment beneﬁts, and will get an equal amount as social assistance from
time T + m on. This assumption will be conﬁrmed by the analysis below.
VU,T =











(1 − θ)T =
(1 − R)( ¯ C + B)
γ0R[(1 − R)VE − ¯ C − B(1 − Rn + Rm−1)]
(24)
Note that if there are no beneﬁts (B = 0) the moment when the individual
stops searching comes later (the numerator goes down while the denominator
goes up).
Let’s assume for simplicity that δ = 0 (no separation, once attached) and
E = w (the utility deriving from employment is given by the salary). Hence,
VE = w/(1 − R).
The edge between case (i) and case (ii) is then at t = T1, deﬁned as the
moment when the individual stops searching with the beneﬁts, and the edge
between case (ii) and case (iii) is at t = T2, deﬁned as the moment when the
individual stops searching when there are no beneﬁts:
T1 =
log(1 − R) + log( ¯ C + B) − log(γ0R) − log(w − ¯ C − B(1 − Rn + Rm−1))
log(1 − θ)
T2 =
log(1 − R) + log( ¯ C) − log(γ0R) − log(w − ¯ C)
log(1 − θ)
(25)
Note that if w is high enough an increase in the amount of the beneﬁt B
shortens the period covered by the unemployment insurance T1
10; however, it
does not aﬀect the timing of social assistance.
Given B < d it is optimal to give the beneﬁt in case (i) and (iii). But
what about case (ii)? Looking back at eq. 22, we observe that as time in
unemployment goes by γt decreases but ut+1 might well increase, if the condition
ut > 1/γt holds. Hence, the value of ∆ is a priori indeterminate. In order to
go further we have simulated eq. 21. It turns out that the crucial parameter
is θ, the employability depreciation rate. As an example, suppose to normalize
the wage w to 10. Suppose the minimum consumption ¯ C is 30% of the wage,
i.e. 3, the poverty line is at 50% of the wage and thus the beneﬁt B is equal to
2. Consider a discount rate R = .95 and an initial probability of ﬁnding a job
γ0 = .5. Finally, suppose that the working lifetime of an individual is bounded




w − ¯ C(Rn − Rm−1)
( ¯ C + B)(w − ¯ C − B(1 − Rn + Rm−1))log(1 − θ)
(26)
14at l0 = 500 (think of 500 months, i.e. aboout 40 years). 11 Figure 1 reports
the expected unemployment spell ut and the value of ∆ for diﬀerent values of
θ. When time exceeds T2, i.e. when the individual deﬁnitely stops searching
the expected residual length of the unemployment spell is equal to the residual
lifetime, i.e. 500 − lt. Before T2 it is computed using eq. 21. The expected
residual length of the unemployment spell u turns out to be monotonically
increasing up to T2, when the individual deﬁnitely stops searching and the
residual length coincides with the residual working lifetime. The highlighted
areas correspond to the range [T1,T2]: in this range the values of ∆ are always
negative, hence the beneﬁts are not granted.
Only when θ is very low, as in ﬁgure 2, the expected residual length of the
unemployment spell starts to decrease before T2, and ∆ is positive in the ﬁnal
part of the range [T1,T2]: in this case it would be optimal to start the social
assistance before T2.
If we rule out such low values of the depreciation rate it is optimal to sus-
pend any kind of assistance between [T1,T2]. Thus n, the remaining periods
of unemployment beneﬁts after T1, becomes equal to 0, and m, the number of
period after T1 when social assistance starts, becomes equal to T2 − T1. Hence
the expression of T1 in eq. 25 becomes:
T1 =




In this paper we have proposed a non-equilibrium model in order to explain the
search behavior of unemployed workers. This modeling strategy, framed in a ra-
tional choice paradigm, allows us to investigate the eﬀects of negative duration
dependence in the out-of-unemployment hazard rate, accounting for a decrease
in employability as the unemployment spell lengthens. We have showed that
individuals react to an expected reduction in their search eﬀectiveness by in-
creasing their search eﬀorts. We then analyzed two policies aimed at reducing
poverty. One is an active labor market policy consisting in training courses to
improve the employability of unemployed workers. We showed that it is optimal
for the government to include among the eligibility criteria for subsidized train-
ing a minimum length of the unemployment spell. This spell however must be
short enough for the unemployed workers not to become discouraged and stop
searching. The second is an income support scheme. We showed that for a broad
range of the parameters the optimal scheme takes the form of unemployment
beneﬁts granted for a limited amount of time starting from the beginning of the
unemployment spell, coupled with social assistance for long-term unemployed
with very limited residual employability.
Considering the possibility of both income support schemes and retraining, a
typical government intervention schedule will thus look like in ﬁgure 3. Training
11All the results are robust to variations in these parameters.
15Figure 1: Average length of unemployment spell ut(top) and value of ∆ in eq.
22 (bottom), diﬀerent values of θ (in parenthesis). When ∆ < 0 the condition
for granting the beneﬁt cannot hold. The highlighted areas correspond to the
range [T1,T2].
16Figure 2: Average length of unemployment spell ut(top) and value of ∆ in eq.
22 (bottom), θ = .02. When ∆ < 0 the condition for granting the beneﬁt cannot
hold. The highlighted areas correspond to the range [T1,T2].
17Figure 3: Income support scheme
courses can be oﬀered both during the period when unemployed workers are
granted unemployment beneﬁts and after, although they should not be oﬀered
at a time when the individuals have already entered a minimum income scheme.
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A Unemployment duration
A.1 No decay in the hazard(θ = 0)
When search eﬀectiveness remains constant over time, i.e. γt = γ∀t,the average




(n + 1)(1 − γ)n (28)









A.2 Linear decay in the hazard
If, as assumed in the model, search eﬀectiveness linearly decreases over time





(n + 1)(1 − θ)n
n−1 Y
j=0
(1 − γ0(1 − θ)j) (29)















j=0(1−γ0(1−θ)j) < 1 for any value of γ0 and θ in (0,1), the
average duration u0 is ﬁnite.
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